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Hong Kong has emerged as one of the three largest financial
centers of the world. Since the banking crisis of the sixties, the
banking industry has undergone great transformation to suit the market
needs. Because of the dramatic decline in the property market since
1981, banks have been exposed to great losses in their lending
activities. The uncertainty over the political future of Hong Kong
has shaken the confidence of some investors. These, coupled with
the imprudence of some bankers, have touched off yet another banking
crisis of the eighties.
This paper analyses the underlying causes of the crises. The
present Banking Ordinance and the new proposed Banking Bill will be
studied. The paper then proceeds to analyse the efficacy and feasibility
of deposit insurance in Hong Kong. A survey is carried out to collect
the depositors' views on deposit insurance. The writer concludes with
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Hong Kong's post-war economy changed rapidly. During the past
fifteen years, it has emerged as a financial center from a relatively
obscure entrepot. Hong Kong possesses almost all the ingredients of
a viable financial center. The city is situated in the Asia-Pacific
region with a natural harbor. Its communication facilities and
transportation networks are excellent. Being a gateway to China, it
attracts many multinational firms who are trying to establish or
strengthen business ties with China. Most important of all is Hong
Kong Government's positive non-interventionism attitude towards
business. There is no exchange control whatsoever over capital flows.
The government provides the businesses a low tax rate, simple tax
structure and minimum interference. These become the determinants of
Hong Kong's emergence as a major financial center.
There were 71 licensed banks established in Hong Kong in the
beginning of 1969. The number has been doubled to 150 at the end of
February 1986. Over half of them are foreign banks. They were
attracted by the expansion of the local economy, the property market
boom and the strong export and re-export activities during the late
70s. Everybody jumped on the bandwagon to share a piece of Hong Kong's
success during 1978 to 1981. Even the banking sector being known for its
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conservativeness, loosened its lending policy which exposed themselves
in a situation they have never dreamed of.
In 1982 the financial institutions' expansion came to a halt.
The collapse of the property market brought a degree of sobriety as
well as a spate of hangovers. When property values collapsed, so
did many of the careless lenders. Since 1982, some 60 deposit taking
companies have gone out of business, voluntarily or involuntarily.
Bank failures happened one after another. We are facing the most serious
banking crisis since the 1965 banking crisis.
3CHAPTER II
SCOPE OF STUDY AND METHODOLOGY
While this study reviews the historical banking crisis and it
underlying causes, the main thrust is to attempt to see what can bE
done to avert the problem. Attention will also be paid to the
credibility of the Banking Ordinance and the Feasibility of the
deposit insurance.
A qualitative approach is adopted for this paper. The writer
obtains the necessary data mainly through the following sources:
1. Review of published articles and books through library research.
2. Study of the proposed new Banking Bill.
3. Interviews with bankers to obtain their viewpoints towards banking
crisis.
4. Statistics published in the Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics.
A survey is conducted to find out the public attitude towards
deposit insurance. The writer decides to use telephone interviews
for the following reasons:
1. It is a quick way of obtaining information.
2. The cost per response is relatively low.
3. A random sample is easily achieved.
Tl,- mr,o C7A ran hP nrP-determined.
4A sample size of 100 is thought to be sufficient for this
purpose. Random-dialing technique is used to ensure a sample is
randomly chosen and unbiased. Calls are made between seven to nine
o'clock in the evenings when most of the head of the households are
at home. The survey excludes the numbers in the Business Classified
Directory because corporations are expected to be sophisticated enough
to choose the banks.
5CHAPTER III
HISTORY OF THE BANKING CRISE
Banking Crises are by no means common in Hong Kong. We had
the 1965 banking crisis that shook the whole financial system. After
almost twenty years, we are experiencing another crisis which inevitably
tarnish the image of Hong Kong being as a financial center.
The Banking Crisis in the 1960s
The crisis occurred at a time when regulatory framework and
commercial bank management were not well developed. Whenever there is a
downturn in the economy, rumours will circulate about the alleged
difficulty of certain banks. Since the small depositors were not
sophisticated and were panic rather easily, they would queue up at banks
to withdraw their deposits at the first sign of trouble. This is
understandable because everyone wants to safeguard his savings. Let
us look at a few incidents happened in the 1960s.
Liu Chong Hing Bank
In June 1961, rumours circulated that Liu Chong Hing Bank was
having liquidity problem. On 14th June 1961, crowds queued up in the
bank to withdraw their deposits. Three days later, the Hong Kong and
Shanghai Bank and the Chartered Bank announced their joint support of
Liu Chong Hing Bank, the run.was subsided. The aftermath was HK$30
million deposit lost due to the withdrawals by some 20000 depositors.
6Ming Tak Bank
On 23th January 1965, the news leaked out following the incapabili
of Ming Tak Bank to honour US$ cheques worth about HK$700 million.
A run started on Ming Tak Bank. On 27 January 1965, the Banking
Commissioner assumed control under section 13 of the Banking ordinance.
After close examination, Ming Tak Bank was found to be both illiquid
and insolvent. Eventually, the bank was declared bankrupt on 30 April
Canton Trust and Commercial Bank
The Ming Tak Bank incident touched off a series of runs on
other banks in February 1965. On 6 February, crowds queued up
Canton Trust and Commercial Bank to withdraw their money. Two days
later, Canton Trust announced that all its office would be closed for
business. They wanted to take a bank holiday to recap what is going
on. The Financial Secretary acted immediately in ordering the
acquisition of Canton Trust by the Banking Commissioner. Depositors
of other banks started to panic and a series of runs broke out on the
same day in Hang Seng Bank, Kwong On Bank, Wing Lung Bank, Dao Heng
Bank etc. After a series of actions by the Government, the Hong Kong
and Shanghai Bank and the Chartered Bank, the crisis was subsided.
The depositors of Canton Turst recovered part of their deposits after
flipiouidation of the bank. However, it materialized only years later.
Hang Seng Bank
The February crisis was not the end. In mid-March 1965, rumours
circulated that Heng Seng Bank was in trouble. Large crowds again
queued up at its offices to withdraw money. Hang Seng Bank put into
measures such as limited withdrawal per day and announced in the media
to plead to the depositors to stay calm. In the mean time, Hang Seng
pledged its available assets to Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank for support.
1965.
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Finally, Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank came to rescue by announcing
unlimited support to Hang Seng Bank. The cost was that Hang Seng Bank
agreed to be acquired 51% of controlling interest by Hong Kong and
Shanghai Bank. The aftermath of this run was loss of HK$200 million
which was almost 1/3 of the total deposits. It took Hang Seng Bank years
to recover these losses.
Banking Crisis in the 1980s
Since the 1965 banking crisis that shook the financial system
to its foundation, there have been only two bank runs so far: one was
the run on Sun Hung Kai Finance Co. in 1978. It was touched off by
irresponsible rumours and quickly subsided after support was pledged by
the major banks. The more damaging one was Hang Lung Bank in late 1982
In the recent cases, the Government wasn't taking any chance, but moved
quickly to take over the troubled banks.
Hang Lung Bank
The underlying factor responsible for the failure of Hang Lung
Bank was the collapse of its wholly-owned subsidiary- Dollar Credit,
a deposit-taking company, in late 1982. Hang Lung Bank was hit by a
bank run in September 1982 after the rumour that the bank was associated
with the Tse Lee Yuen incident. Although the run was quickly subsided
after support was pledged by the Government and some leading banks
(including Standard Chartered Bank), the depositors gradually shifted
their money to the big banks. Following the bank run, some banks including
the foreign banks, withdrew the facilities previously granted to Hang
Lung Bank. Finally, with the incapability of honouring cheques of
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HKD140 million, the Government decided to step in. On 27th September,
1983, the Legislative council passed the Hang Lung Bank (Acquisition)
Bill, authorizing the government to take over Hang Lung Bank. The
acquisition came around at a time when:
- The U.S. dollar was rocketed to a record high of 9.6 H.K. dollar,
reflecting the anxiety of the local community on the 1997 issue.
- The Sino-British negotiation ran into difficulty which caused the
public to panic.
Under these circumstances, any rumour about the credibility of
the banks would have a devastating effect. The Government had no
choice but to take over the Hang Lung Bank in order to avoid the turmoil
of the financial industry.
Overseas Trust Bank
The Overseas Trust Bank (OTB) was established in 1955 by Mr.
Chang Ming Thien. The trouble precipitated when Mr. Chang died on
27th March, 1982. A report said there is a great portion of loans
granted by Mr. Chang without formal documents whatsoever. This made
it extremely difficult to recover these loans. However, this and
other illegal acts were concealed from the public. His son, Patrick
Chang succeeded his father to become managing director of the bank.
Things looked rosy on the surface, but the situation continued
deteriorating. In October 1984, under the pressure of the Banking
Commission, Mr. Patrick Chang was shifted to become Chairman of the
bank's executive committee and his sister, Miss Chang Lee Sian, became
9the managing director. The public thought it was only the shift between
the family members.
Much to the surprise of the public, the directors of OTB
submitted a declaration to the Banking Commissioner at about 4:00PM
on 6th June, 1985, stating that the bank was insolvent and unable to
continue the operation. In that evening, Mr. Robert Fell, the Banking
Commissioner, together with Sir John Bremridge, the Financial Secretary,
ordered the closure of all the branches of OTB until further notice.
At that night, Mr. Patrick Chang was detained at Kai Tak Airport
He took with him cash and securities worth over HK$ 1 million. The
Commercial Crime Bureau immediately took charge in setting up a task
force in the Bank's head office to investigate the Bank's affairs.
On 7th June 1985, a special session of the Executive Council was
convened, resulting in the Legislative Council reluctantly passing
the Overseas Trust Bank (Acquisition) Bill 1985. It authorized the Govern-
ment to take over the OTB. The cost of acquiring the OTB was estimated
to be around HK$ 2 billion which would be absorbed by the Exchange Fund.
This event came at a time after the.Sino-British agreement was signed.
The confidence of the public was restored. The HK$ peg against the
US$ has been extremely successful. The reasons for the Government to
take over OTB were less persuasive than the Hang Lung case, except
that it was preventing the domino effect of the bank failure and tried
to maintain the credibility of Hong Kong as a financial center.
In this incident, the depositors were left unscathed. The ones who
got hurt were the small shareholders who saw their investments turned
into nothing overnight.
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Hong Kong Industrial and Commercial Bank
The Hong Kong Industrial and Commercial Bank (HKICB) was
established in 1964. Overseas Trust Bank (OTB) gained control in 1973
with 71.1% of HKICB's voting shares. OTB gradually increased HKICB's
holding to 94.3% in 1979. In November 1980, HKICB went public and
OTB reduced its holding of HKICB to about 590. In May 1985, Hong Leong
Securities Ltd. offered to buy all HKICB's share with securities worth
HK$4.06 per share. OTB agreed to sell its 62% stake in HKICB to
Hong Leong Securities Limited. Before the deal was completed, OTB was
declared insolvent and was taken over by the Government. Since HKICB was
the subsidary of OTB, it was also in effect taken over by the Government.
Hong Kong Bank had sent in a team of senior officers to take over the
operations of HKICB. The directors beleived that a good portion of the
loans were non-recoverable, so they appointed Peat, Marwick Mitchell to
have a special audit of the Bank. The auditor later declared that the
bank had loss HK$340 million for the period ending 7th June 1985,
which gave the bank a net liability of HK$97 million. It was mainly due
to the non-recoverable loans, part of them were using OTB stock as
collateral. On 25 October 1985, the shareholders passed the resolution
for a major capital reconstruction under which shareholder's funds
were written down by almost 94%. The Government also used the Exchange
Fund to inject HK$408 million into the bank for its preferred shares.
HKICB continued its business as usual and its share was listed again
on 18 Novermber 1985. All the depositors were left unscathed. The small
shareholders were the ones who got burned when the share price dropped
to HK$0.60 form HK$3.80.
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Wing On Bank
Following the acquisition of OTB and HKICB by the Hong Kong
Government, business for Wing On Bank had become particularly difficult.
The doubtful loans were greatly increased while the deposits were
gradually reduced. In light of the above situation, the Wing On Bank
had no choice but to seek a strong partner for new equity capital before
things got worse. On 19 December 1985, the Wing On (Holding) Limited
suspended the trading of its shares on the stock exchange and subsequent
announced that proposals have been agreed in principle whereby Hang Seng
will acquire a controlling interest in Wing On Bank. With the injection
of HK$176 million by Hang Seng Bank for a 50.3 percent control of voting
share, following the rights issue to raise HK$154 million provided by Wi:
On (Holding) Limited and the Capital Reduction program, the business
for Wing On Bank continues under the wing of Hang Seng Bank. The extent
of bad and doubtful loans were estimated to be in excess of HK$200
million. The joint auditors Peat Marwick Mitchell and Price Waterhouse
had completed their audit of the bank. Sources said the parties
concerned were satisifed with the provisions for doubtful loans.
If business returns to normal, it may take two years for the Bank
to return to profitability.
Ka Wah Bank
The Ka Wah Bank was established in 1924 and was listed as a
public company in 1980. The major shareholder is C S Low Investment Ltd.
of Malaysia. After the collapse of the OTB, rumours circulated that
the smaller banks were in trouble. For Ka Wah Bank, withdrawals were
much higher than usual and the bank ran into liquidity problem. In order
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to maintain the confidence of the public, the Hong Kong and Shanghai
Bank and Bank of China jointly announced on 17 June 1985 that they
would extend the standby credit facilities to Ka Wah Bank. News leaked
out that the standby credit amount to HK$1 billion which was guaranteed
by the Exchange Fund. However, Government officials have declined to
comment as the affairs of the Exchange Fund are kept confidential. The
Banking Commissioner also announced that Ka Wah Bank's financial situation
was in good order. On the surface, things seems returned to normal.
In November 1985, Pan-Electric Industries of Malaysia went into
receivership which affected a great number of companies in Malaysia and
Singapore. Although Ka Wah did not extend any direct loan to Pan-Electric
Industries, its exposure in Malaysia and Singapore would surely do a lot
of damages.
On 2 December 1985, Ka Wah Bank's listing was suspended in the
stock exchange pending the merger talk. In this case, the Government
was not willing to acquire the Ka Wah Bank because it would surely meet
with strong opposition from the Legislative Council. Nevertheless,
the Government could not afford the risk of allowing the bank to fail.
Merging with a third party was the only viable choice at that time.
Mr. David Nendick, the Secretary for Monetary Affairs, and Mr. Robert
Fell, the Banking Commissioner, have played a key role in finding a
strong partner for the Ka Wah Bank.
On 3 January, China International Trust and Investment Corporation
(CITIC) agreed, in principle., to acquire a major stake in Ka Wah Bank.
An intense negotiation had been gone on for two months and a proposal
was worked out on 8 March. CITIC planned to inject HK$350 million
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into the bank to acquire a 92% stake. To the extent the provisions
to be made against the existing loan portfolio prove to be insufficient,
CITIC would guarantee the collectability of the existing loans of Ka
Wah Bank within a period of not more than 3 years, subject to the
provision of a counter-guarantee by the Hong Kong Governemnt from the
Exchange Fund.
The depositors were spared once again. The losses incurred by
the small shareholders will be substantial before Ka Wah is to be
listed again. This crisis has intensified nervousness in the territory
over the financial health of other smaller banks. The question persists
whether the Government has any fundamental method for eradicating the
problem.
Union Bank
Union Bank was incorporated in November 1964. It has a network
of 13 branches in Hong Kong. Mr. Oen Yin-Choy is both the chairman
and chief executive, holds about 60% of the bank's share.
The Bank was greatly affected by the unfavorable market
conditions. Since the OTB case, rumors circulated that Union Bank w
in trouble, causing a steady shift of deposits away from the bank.
On 20 June 1985, the auditors had qualified their opionion on the
accounts of the Bank as at 31 December 1984. They were unable to fo
an opinion as to whether loans and advances totalling HK$265 million
can be recovered.
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The prolonged absence of the bank's chairman, Mr. Oen, prompted
the resignation of a number of directors. On 27 March 1986, the
Commissioner directed Jardine Fleming to assume control and carry
on the business of the Bank. The rescue action also involved a
substantial credit line from the Exchange Fund, which, according to
Mr. Fell, was sufficient to ensure all the claims of depositors and
other creditors. The amount of the credit line was estimated to be
in excess of one billion dollar.
Sources close to the bank indicated that concentration of loans
to Southeast Asian countries, notably, Indonesia, accounted for
part of the problem. This was the result of weak lending policy in
the past few years. The management control was concentrated in one
person, which has been found unsatifactory by the Banking Commission.
Finding a strong partner, which can provide both the capita:
and management expertise, is considered as the most logical and




THE UNDERLYING CAUSES FO THE BANKING CRISES
Generally speaking, banks are faced with two types of Risk-
liquidity risk and insolvency risk. Liquidity risk occurs whena bank
does not have enough cash or current assets to meet its obligations.
Insolvency risk exists when the bank's assets are less than its
liabilities, that is, it has a negative net worth. The crises in the
1960s were mainly due to the liquidity problem caused by bank runs
while the crises in the 1980s were mainly due to insolvency.
It is relatively easier to deal with the liquidity problem. If it
is an isolated case, it will be a matter of recycling the deposits withi
the banking industry: the depositors move money from one bank to another
There is no net loss to the system. Since the bank's assets value are
greater than its liabilities, the problem can be solved by lifeboat
operation or discount window operation. In some cases, the troubled
bank will be taken over or merged with a stronger partner. It has
successfully worked in Liu Chong Hing Bank in 1961, Hang Seng Bank,
Wing Lung Bank etc. in 1965, Sun Hung Kai Finance Co. Ltd in 1978,
Wing On Bank in 1985 and Ka Wah Bank in 1986.
Insolvency is a different matter. Once a bank has reached a
negative net worth, it has no. advantage to leave the bank in the hands
of its original shareholders unless they inject fresh capital. If an
insolvent bank is allowed to remain open, the management, having
depleted shareholders' funds, is essentially speculating on the
depositors' money. They will speculate to win back the losses. The
16
Banking Commissioner must act immediately and decisively to minimize
the losses. We witnessed the Hang Lung case in 1983, OTB case and
HKICB case in 1985 which highlighted the insolvency. The recent banking
crisis can be traced back to the period between 1978-1981, when too
many banks over-extended their loans creating a system too fragile and
intertwined to withstand any economic and political. Before we propose
any remedial action, we must analyse the underlying causes of the
crisis.
The Faltering Economy
During 1978-1981, the Hong Kong's economy looked very promising.
The export figures were excellent. The property market was booming.
The stock market which was dominated by the property companies were
heading to its historical high. On 17 July 1981, Hang Seng Index hit its
all time high of 1810.20. The unrealized paper profit of the rising
stock market produced a great number of millionaires. The increased
consumption on goods, especially expensive foreign goods, fuelled the
economy further.
The huge Government projects such as Mass Transit Railway and
Homeownership Housing Scheme greatly increased the demand for labor
which pushed the labor wages and the consumer prices up. The expectation
of inflation also pushed the property prices higher. The banks were
more willing to lend to the property developers under this scenario.
The banker's position was a traditional one in the never-ending cycle
of building boom and busts. During the boom period, they relaxed their
lending policy because the value of their collaterals were increasing.
They were also afraid to challenge the market judgment of the developers,
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for example, Mr. Tan of Carrian, who often dealt in billions, not
millions of,dollars. Huge profit were sitting there for them if the
property market kept booming. No banker wanted to be missed out.
During that period, the relaxed lending policy caused the increase
in money supply which in turn pushed the interest rate lower. The
lower interest rate would stimulate the investment. The demand for goods
and services was more than the economy can supply which fuelled the
inflation futher. An average house valued at three hundred thousand in
1976 shot up to two million in 1981. We can see the snowball effect of
inflation had taken its toll on the economy.
Even a prestigious company, Hong Kong Land, changed its policy
of concentration in Central and made an agreement with Carrian to re-
develop the site of Miramar Hotel at the height of the property boom.
In hindsight, it proved to be a serious mistake that Hong Kong Land
had committed in choosing its partner and the price it paid were
exorbitant. Hong Kong Land later got into a complex litigation with
Miramar when Carrian went into receivership. They finally settled the
case out of court with losses of over HK$700 million just to get out
of the agreement. Another mistake they committed was the purchase of
the Exchange Square site at an exorbitant price of HK$4.7 billion which
proved to be too costly. It forced Hong Kong Land to sell off the assets
and made new loan arrangement with the lenders later.
The over-commitment of land, capital and labor resources to the
property sector between 1978-81 did produce one of the most bullish
periods in Hong Kong's economic history. It generated more business for
Pvprvone as well as huge profits for developers and banks. It did create
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full employment and it did lift real wages faster than anything hitherto.
It also held back the impact of global recession due to the influx of invest
ment (or speculative) capital from other countries.
However, it was more than Hong Kong's economy as a whole could
digest. The foreign capital were mainly invested in the stock market and
the property market. When the property boom hit its height, investors
found their return diminishing and would be better off if invested in
other markets. They decided to pull out of the Hong Kong stock and
property market which gave a tremendous pressure on the economy. The
Hang Seng index dropped almost 700 points from the height of 1810 in
17 July 1981 to 1113 in less than 3 months. It futher declined to 676
on 2 December 1982. The total market capitalization of the listed stock
also dropped from the height of HK$284 billion in July 1981 to HK$216
billion in October 1981. It further declined to the low of HK$119 billion
at the end of November 1982. The wealth of HK$165 billion disappeared
in just 16 months, leaving a devastating effect on the economy. The
global recession has finally caught up with us. With the dismal export
figures, the expected improvement in disposable income had also
disappeared. The consumers' buying power had shrunk further. Property
prices slumped as interest rates climbed when the banks tried to tighten
up the lending facilities and to support the Hong Kong dollar. The
high interest rate and tight lending policy further aggravated the property
sector. The economic boom finally went burst when the uncertainty
about 1997 added to economic woes.
This adjustment had been most painful to the banks as well as
the nronertv developers and property speculators. One company sold a
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godown site in January 1984 for HK$3 million which it bought for
HK$33 million at the height of the boom. It sold the site to avert
having to continue to pay a penalty to the Government in delaying the
development of the project. Banks are naturally reluctant to release
the figure of not immediately recoverable loans, plus those now
entirely unrecoverable. However, property loans still outstanding are
believed to be around HK$50 billion, of which a good portion becomes
questionable. Those banks overextended the proporty loans at the
height of the boom would have a tough time in recovering the loans.
Especially the smaller banks, they just do not have enough reserves to
cushion the losses which precipitated the crisis later.
The Political Upheaval
Except for a brief interruption in 1967, Hong Kong had been
free from internal social and political unrest. During the 'seventies,
the relations between China, Hong Kong and United Kingdom had
improved steadily after the Cultural Revolution in 1966. Although
there was the leasehold problem, nobody seemed to care to talk about
it.
It was not until September 1982 that the problem of 1997 unveiled
when Mrs. Thatcher visited China. With the credibility of the Falkland
War, Mrs. Thatcher thought she could settle the issue of 1997 easily.
However, she started the meeting by arguing the words fog and mist
with Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang. Indeed, their talk were surrounded
by fog and mist- both sides wanted to keep the content of the meeting
confidential in order to maintain Hong Kong confidence. She then
tripped over the steps in front of the People's Hall after the meeting
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with Mr. Deng. Anyhow, it was hardly a happy augury, the Hong Kong
Chinese were convinced the talks on the future of Hong Kong began in
disaster.
The stock market plummeted in early 1982 shortly after China's
announcement of its intention to take over Hong Kong after 1997. In
December 1982, Hang Seng Index was again halved to 676 in just two
months after the beginning of the talks. Foreign investors had been
withdrawing from Hong Kong gradually. Property prices slumped as the
exodus of the foreign investments as well as the Hong Kong Chinese begun.
While the talks kept on dragging, Hong Kong's economy was in the doldrums.
Every little bit of news about the talks, no matter they are the truth
or rumor, would have a great impact on the stock market.
On September 23 1983, after the end of the second-stage fourth
round of talks, the joint announcement of the result was missing. Instead,
each party had their own announcement which was also delated three
hours. When news reached Hong Kong, rumors immediately circulated, such
as no joint announcement, the negotiation broken off, the future of
Hong Kong is hitting the brick wall, this round of talk is a diaster,
no futher talks will be scheduled. These rumors also appeared in the
leading newspaper. The very next day, Hong Kong dollar dropped to a
record low of HK$9.6 to one US dollar. People even went out to the
supermarket to corner the rice, bread and can food etc., The society
was in a state of panic and unrest. Every little bit of rumor about
the financial institution would have a devastating effect. Hang Lung
Bank was the victim which fell on September 27 1983. The Government
acted immediately and decisively to take over Hang Lung Bank to avert
a possible bank run which may spread to other banks.
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Incompetence of the Bank Management
One common factor of the recent bank failures is that all the failed
banks committed large sum of loans to Southeast Asia countries, namely,
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia. The practice of the businessmen in
these countries are traditionally speculative. Unfortunately, Overseas
Trust Bank, Ka Wah Bank and Union Bank are intimately associated with
the businessmen in this region. The total regional lending of the
Hong Kong banks are estimated to be in the vicinity of HK$150 billion.
Property loans account for one-seventh of all bank lending. The economy
of these countries have been turning poor since 1981. The banks' manage-
ment should be aware of the problems. However, their decisions were
based rather on friendship than on pure business logic. When the
recession hit the region, property price slumped, business went into
difficulties, even Indonesia has an oil price crisis recently.
Last November, Pan-Electric Industries of Malaysia went into
receivership. A chain of companies associated with Pan-Electric Industries
also went into trouble. Its majority shareholder Tan Koon Swan was
arrested in Singapore in January this year. He was then charged with
committed commercial crime. Although the banks were tight-lipped about
the losses in this incident, we are sure that the banks with heavy
exposure in these countries will take a beating.
During the property market boom in the late seventies, the banks
were overcommitted their loans to the property sector due to their
greed and imprudence. Eventually, they suffer now with large provisions
for the loans they made during those years. Large banks have enough
capital and reserves to cushion the losses caused by their mistakes.
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However, small banks were less fortunate, their capital and reserves
were drained by the losses.
Some banks will try to spread its risk geographically but many
banks may decide to lend only into their home market where they know
best. Nevertheless, they shall not concentrate their lending on one or
two industries even there is no permanent formula to calculate an
ideal mix. The changing environment of different sector requires an
alert banker to change the pattern of his lending policy. It is also
unwise to lend a large part of its loan to one or two firms and their
associated companies. It is the bank's management who get pay to
make that wise decisions. Sadly enough, Chairman of Overseas Trust
Bank, Mr. Huang Tiong Chan, and Chairman of the Union Bank, Mr. Oen
Yin Choy were both absent from their posts for an extend period before
the banks went into trouble. It seems they abandoned their ships before
they sank. How can they expect the depositors have the confidence in
their banks?
Criminal Offence Committed by the Bank's Management
People entrust their money to the bankers' integrity., It is
surprising how often greed, even alleged fraud and corruption takes
place.
In the cases of Dollar Credit, Dominican Finance Ltd., Hang Lung
Bank and Overseas Trust Bank etc., they all committed commercial crimes
one way or the other. Under the scurtiny of the Banking Ordinance and
the Security Ordinance, it is startling to learn that flTerseas Trust Bank
was involved in illegal activities which was not detected as early as
1981.
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It was reported that Mr. Simon Yip, the Chairman of the defunct
Dominican'Finance Limited and the honorary consul in Hong Kong for the
Dominican Republic for nine years, had been granted a loan of at least
HK$35 million by OTB without collaterals. It was also reported that
hundreds of millions of funds had been illegally channelled out of
Hong Kong through Singaport, Malaysia and Sri Lanka by the OTB officials.
In the evening of 6th June 1985 when OTB declared its unsolvency, its
Chairman Patrick Chang, instead of trying to solve the problem, tried to ge
away with cash and securities worth over HK$1 million. He was detained
at Kai Tak Airport and was later charged with the other senior management
officials on
1. Conspiracy to defraud creditors, depositors and shareholders of OTB.
2. Dishonestly cause the Bank to make excessive loans or advances.
to companies associated with or under the control of the Chairmar
of the Board;
inadequately secured and inadequately guaranteed, and made withot
proper provisions for payment of interest and principals
made in the circumstances where the true identity of the borrowe
was concealed; and
made in the circumstances where the true nature and effect of the
loans and advances were disguised in the books and records of the
Bank.
During the transitional period to 199/, we must be aware or the
"end of the age" attitude prevailing in the business circle which causes
some people to utilize every apportunity to work to their own benefits,
even running the risk of committing crime.
24
CHAPTER V
GOVERNMENT'S ROLE IN THE BANKING CRISES
Hong Kong has long been known as a free market. The Government's
positive non-interventionism earns its reputation among the business
world. The golden rule of those who can adapt survive has always
been the unwritten consitution in Hong Kong. Acquisition of failed
bank does not only contradict with this rule, but also brings another
issue of legal equality. The Government continually rescued troubled
local banks, lifting the status of the failed banks on top of the other
commercial failures. In other industral sector, the market dictates
who remains in business. But the banks appear to enjoy the privilege
of being protected by the Government who has not left banks to the mercy
of the market force so far. It is unfair to the creditors of the other
commercial failures which the Government did not bother to lend a hand.
It is also unfair to use the public fund to rescue the failed commercial
banks.
Although it could be understood that the Hang Lung case was a
distinct one due to the political and monetary upheaval in September
1983, the cases of OTB, Ka Wah, and Union Bank were less persuasive.
It is interesting to learn that after each incident, the uoverJIn1ei1L
officials would announce that the other banks were in healthy situation
and the Government would not easily come into rescue if there was another
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failure. It is either the incompetence of the Government officials
towards the.banks' affairs or they were telling a lie to comfort the
Hong Kong people. The writer thinks the latter should be the case
since the Government is well aware of the problem.
Five banks went into trouble since Hang Lung Bank failed in 1982
The tough stand the Government took did not help the smaller banks, th
depositors gradually shift their money to larger banks in fear of the
absence of Government support in case the bank fails.
The Government wants to maintain the credibility of Hong Kong as
a financial center. We cannot afford to allow banks to fall, which
may cause the disruption to the economy. The Financial Secretary, Sir
John Bremridge, was under fire recently on the use of the Exchange
Fund to rescue the troubled banks. The writer thinks it is proper to
use the Exchange Fund to support the Hang Lung Bank because of its
special situation and, to a lesser extent, the OTB based on social
reasons. However, in both the Ka Wah Bank and Union Bank cases, the
writer is not convinced that the Exchange Fund should be used to
subsidize the mismanagement of these banks. Especially the Union Bank
which was reported only having liquidity problem, it should be able
to arrange a credit line by the larger banks: Hong Kong Bank Bank of
China or Standard Chartered Bank, with the pledge of its assets as
cnlateral.
As in the case of Ka Wah Bank, the Government is rather generous
in using Exchange Fund to guarantee the full collectability of the existing
bans. With limited information on this deal, the writer is doubtful
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whether the value of the bank license and the good will has been
taken into consideration.
Under the present Ordinance, the minimum requirement for granting
a banking licence is ten years experience in deposit taking business,
having deposit of HK$1.75 billion and assets totalling not less than
HK$2.5 billion. It is not easy in granting the banking license. In
recent years, only Sun Hung Kai Bank is granted license through this
channel. The market presently value the banking license at not less tha
HK$100 million. If the deal is based solely on the book value, the
CITIC will gain a great deal thanks to the generosity of the Hong Kong
Government. Under the Sino-British agreement, Hong Kong Government is
responsible to maintain the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong
during the transitional years leading to 1997. The danger is that the
Government is seen to be assuming heavier responsibility to support the
ailing banks. One moral hazard is that the self-discipline in the
industry may be slowly weakened when they were protected from failure.
Let us look at the legislative and policy framework in which
banking has evolved since World War II. We had the Banking Ordinance
of January 30, 1948 which sought to provide for the regulation and
licensing of the business of banking. Licensing and control were
statutorily in the hands of the Governor. The control was sufficient
for local banking in the post-war reconstruction period.
After a decade of development, the ordinance was inadequate.
That brought the report on the Hong Kong banking system and
recommendations for the replacement of the Banking Ordinance 1948
by Mr. Tomkins in April 1962. Mr. Tomkins came frog Bank of England
and his report has been the groundwork of our present system.
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The Existing Banking Ordinance
The.existing Banking Ordinance was initially adopted in October
1964 to make better provision for the licensing and control of banks,
banking business and matters connected therewith. It has been
modified and amended since then. The main features of the control
areas of the Bill are described below.
1. Maintenance of a minimum liquid asset ratio of 25%.-
2. Maintenance of a minimum of $200 million worth of issued and paid-
up capital and reserves
3. Adequate provision for bad and doubtful loans should have been made
against earnings
4. No dividend should be paid unless all intangible assets have been
written off and the paid-up capital and reserves should not be
less than $200 million after payment of dividend
5. No loan could be granted against the shares of the Bank as
collateral
6. Loans to one individual or corporation should not exceed 25% of the
paid-up capital and reserves
7. Loans to directors of the Bank and their relatives should not exceed
10% of the paid-up capital and reserves
8. Clean loans to employees should not exceed one year salary of the
employee
9. Cannot participate in wholesale, retail, import and export trade
10. Share investments in other companies caould not exceed 25% of paid-up
capital and reserves
11. Ownership in investment properties could not exceed 25% of paid-up
capital and reserves and
12. Submit to the Banking Commissioner weekly returns (as of every
WPnPsav and monthly returns reflecting the Bank's financial
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position.
The basic spirit of the Ordinance could be summed up as follows:
1. To ensure adequate liquidity.
2. To ensure a healthy capital level.
3. To ensure any bad loans will be reflected in the earnings.
4. To ensure the safety of the loan collateral.
5. To safeguard the assets of the bank from putting all eggs in
a basket.
6. To prevent overlending to the bank directors and its staff.
7. To ensure the bank not going into non-bank businesses.
8. To prevent the bank from going into high risk businesses where
large amount of capital would be tied up.
9. To ensure the commissioner has adequate information of the bank.
This Ordinance weathered the banking crisis in the sixties,
the stock market crisis in the seventies and the banking crisis in
the eighties. Although it has been modified and amended many times,
it will never reach perfection. Businessmen can get around even the
tightest rules. Loopholes are developed over time. Major
weaknesses of the present Banking Ordinance are as follows.
Ij -L%ALAJ--LL,j
Specified liquid assets comprise of cash, gold, interbank claims
within 7 days, short term bonds, government securities, bills and
negotiable certificate of deposits etc.. During an interview, Mr. Lam
Ming Leong, deputy general manager of National Commercial Bank of
29
Hong Kong indicated that an irresponsible bank can create liquid
asset to meet the requirement simply by borrowing loans with maturity
of more than 7 days from the interbank market and then lend it out to
the same bank with matruity within 7 days. For example, Bank A borrows
100 million from Bank B and immediately lends the 100 million back
to Bank B for maturity of 7 dyas. Bank A thereby creates 100 million
liquid assets with liability of 100 million. According to the 25%
liquid assets ratio stated in the Banking Ordinance, Bank A can loan
out another 300 million without violating the law.
This example shows that a bank's lending facility can be
created without the support of the deposits. The money supply can
also be created. This scenario happened in the late seventies when
the economy was overheated. The rapid expansion of the money supply
fuelled the inflation and economic growth. This lack of control of
money supply is one of the foundamental factors of the severe boom
and bust economic cycle in Hong Kong.
Capital and Reserves
The Banking Ordinance requires the bank to maintain a minimum
of HK$200 million worth of paid up capital and reserves. The purpose is
to allow the bank to provide a cushion against the losses. However,
the absolute figure lacks flexibility and comparability between the
large and small banks. To a small bank, HK$200 million may be too high.
To a large bank, the amount seems nothing. It also does not take into
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consideration of the risk of assets and liabilities. Furthermore,
this rule applies only to the locally incorporated banks. Foreign
banks having full-scale banking operations in Hong Kong do not have
to be obliged by it.
It is recommended that quantitative ratio like capital to
liability ratio or capital to assets ratio be adopted. Historically,
bank losses incurred from the doubtful loans which were the assets.
The bank assets have various degree of risk, therefore, we should use
capital to risk assets to evaluate the capital adequacy of the bank.
lua11 L' L1 V C ttJJCJJ11IC11 t- -1,
Quantitative ratios can be derived from the-balance sheet of the
bank. Since many information can be concealed or distorted under the
present system, the reliability of the ratios are greatly reduced.
Especially when the management wants to deceive, it is very easy to
work on figures.
Mr. Lam said that during his years of experience in banking
business, it is very difficult for a bank to incur losses in the long
run if the bank has sound management. The recent crisis is mainly due
to the poor management of the individual bank, especially some with
loans to its directors which may be irregular and illegal. In order to
close this loophole, we must modify the bill in this area. At the same
time, we must evaluate the qualitative aspect on the management in order
to determine its soundress. Areas to be evaluated include
- Quality of management
- Turnover of assets
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- Past earning records
- Nature. and quality of rights owned
- Magnitude of fluctuation of deposit levels
- Smoothness of operation
- Ability to compete in this highly competitive market
- Nature of operating expenditure.
The qualitative assessment requires higher costs and more manpower,
but the analysis of the soundness of the bank will not be reliable
without it.
Although this Banking Ordinance has been working for the past
twenty years, it must be modified again to close the loopholes which
were exploited by the irresponsible bankers. It must also be able to
deal with the problems which emerge as market circumstances change.
There have been some unforgettable lessons learned by the regulators
in the past three years. This experience should be used as the back-
bone for the new Banking Bill.
The Proposed Banking Bill 1986
The much-awaited Banking Bill 1986 was gazetted on 7 March 1986.
The Bill was drafted after extensive consultations with the banking
industry. It will replace the present Banking and Deposit-taking
Companies Ordinances and give the Commissioner the same power and
control over deposit-taking companies that he has over banks.
The Banking community generally agrees that it will give the
Banking Commissioner reasonable power and flexibility in supervising
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financial institutions. The public were given two months to comment
on the Bill before it is tabled at the Legislative Council for the
second reading in May. Subject to the approval of Le gco, the Bill
is expected to be implemented in June 1986.
The purposes of this Bill are:
1. To regulate banking business and the business of taking deposits.
2. To make provision for the supervision of authorized institutions
so as to provide a measure of protection to depositors.
3. To promote the general stability and effectiveness of the banking
system.
The Bill makes new provisions in six main areas.




Regulation of ownership and management
Limitations on loans.
Capital to Risk Asset Ratio
A statutory capital to risk assets ratio is set at five per cent
for all banks and deposit-taking companies (DTC) incorporated in Hong
Kong. However, the commissioner may, by notice in writing, increase the
ratio for a particular institution to a ceiling of not more than eight
per cent in the case of banks and to not more than ten per cent in the
case of DTCs. The method of calculation is contained in the Third
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Schedule to the Bill. Please refer to appendix V.
It is not an offense if an institution contravene the minimum
ratio. However, it is an offense if an institution fails to report
the contravention, or carry out remedial action required by the
Commissioner. An institution may appeal to the Financial Secretary
against any remedial action required by the Commissioner.
This ratio applies only to institutions incorporated in Hong
Kong. Foreign institutions are exempted from this restriction since
the capital adequacy should be scrutinized by the countries where the
institutions are incorporated.
Since this is a substantial requirement on institutions, the
law provides two years of transitional period after the other provisions
of the Bill take effect, thus providing institutions an interim
period to organize their affairs to meet the requirements.
This part is designed to remedy the detlclency or the exi5Lirig
Ordinance which prescribed the minimum capital requirement while bearing
no relationship to the amount and riskiness of the assets they support.
The ratio was initially set at ten percent. After vigorous opposition
by the bankers, the Government backed down to set a minimum requirement
of five percent. However, the Government shows its determination to
tighten up the rule by empowering the Commissioner to increase the
ratio if necessary.
During the interim period, the writer believes the banks will
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try to meet the requirement by doing the following
1. To increase the paid-up capital.
2. To retain more earnings and pay less dividend.
3. To reduce the investment in associated companies.
4. To reduce the amount of loans to customers.
5. Banks will concentrate their interbank loans to eligible banks
which carry a risk weight of 0.2, while registered deposit-taking
companies which carry a risk weight of 0.5 will have difficlties
in the interbank market.
In 1985, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank strengthened its capita:
base with two perpetual floating rate note issues totalling US$800
million. According to the new Banking Bill, these note issues can be
treated as capital in calculating the capital to risk assets ratio.
The maximum allowed amount is half of the issued capital. As at the
end of 1985, Hong Kong Bank's issued capital stood at HK$7.86 billion.
By floating the note issues, Hong Kong Bank has in effect increased it
capital base by HK$3.93 billion. This increased capital will give
the flexibility to Hong Kong Bank to lend an additional amount of
HK$78.6 billion without affecting the ratio requirement of 5%. Hong
Kong Bank seems to be one step ahead of others in this respect. The
writer believes other banks will follow suit if necessary.
Some criticisms from individual groups of banks, notably the
Japanese and Korean institutions, asy that the ratio is not really
flexible enough to accomodate the offshore banking business conducted by
some deposit-taking companies. They urge the Government to create a
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new category of limited service bank to distinguish institutions
dealing in offshore wholesale banking business from the domestic
institutions.
Liquidity ratio
The Bill requires institutions to keep liquid assets for all
liabilities maturing or callable within one month at a ratio of not
less than 25 per cent. The method of calculating this ratio is
contained in the Fourth Schedule to the Bill. Please refer to
appendix VI.
It is considered an improvement over existing liquidity require-
ments which take no account of cash inflows and outflows an institution
reasonably expects over a period of time. The particular provisions of
contravention of the ratio will be the same as the provisions in the
section of capital to risk assets ratio. The Commissioner may impose
additional liquidity requirements, with no upper limits, on any
institution as necessary.
The liquidity ratio is calculated for each calendar month on the
basis of the average of the daily liquidity ratio. This will be a
heavy burden for the banks. Even with today's sophisticated computer,
a Citibank official said its computer will have to work two extra hours
to calculate this ratio everyday.
This requirement is designed to close the loophole of creating
liquidity by round-tripping through either branch and subsidiary accounts
offshore. Under the new Bill, a bank can still create liquidity by
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borrowing in the interbank market with maturity of two months and
immediately lending it back to the same bank with maturity of one
month. Nevertheless, the Bill at least shows the Commissioner is
watching this practice closely.
Commissioner's Power
The Commissioner's existing powers over banks are extended to
deposit-taking companies. The Bill sets out the functions of the
Commissioner and puts the emphasis on the approach to prudential
supervision on the Commissioner's discretion and qualitative judgment.
Financial institutions will have a right to appeal against the
Commissioner's decisions, which will provide proper balance on the
Commissioner's discretionary powers. In addition, the Commissioner
is required to provide an annual report to the Governor in Council
on the working of the Bill and the activities of his office during
the year.
One major concern expressed by the local bankers in this area
is the wider discretionary power the Banking Commissioner will be
endowed with. Mr. Robert Fell is expected to retire next year. The
credibility of his successor and the quality and capability of his
staff to make efficient use of powers are matters of high concern.
Audits
The Bill extends the present audit requirements to deposit
taking companies. The Commissioner will therefore have the power
to appoint a second auditor for deposit-taking companies. It also
provides for tripartite meetings between the governing board of an
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authorized institution, any of the institution's auditors and the
Commissioner, where the affairs of the institution warrant such a
meeting. The Commissioner is empowered to refer the cases of
negligence or serious misconduct by any auditor to the Disciplinary
Committee of the Society of Accountants.
It is startling to learn that some banks ran into trouble only
months after the auditors had examined and declared their accounts as
true and fair. The amount of loan losses discovered afterwards were
enormous. Obviously, the area of auditing should be reviewed. The
auditing procedures should also include the assessment of a bank's
accounting policy, lending policy and management internal control in
order to detect any irregularities at the early stage.
Regulations of Ownership and Management
In order to ensure competence and integrity of senior management
of financial institutions, the Bill proposes that all appointments of
directors and company secretaries will be subject to the Commissioner's
prior approval. The Commissioner is empowered to disapprove the exercise
of voting rights in shares acquired by any party holding ten per cent
or more of the voting shares of an institution.
No controller of a financial institution shall give any directions
or instructions to the directors unless he has the Commissioner's
approval. Controller is defined as a person who can either control
more than fifty per cent of the voting shares of that institution or
of its holding company or c.an influence and direct the decisions of
the management or its holding company. This is clearly designed to
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prevent the manipulation of a bank by the controllers for inside
transactions which is the major cause of the collapse of Hang Lung
Bank and Overseas Trust Bank.
These new provisions apply only to institutions incorporated in
Hong Kong, that is, the 35 local banks and 301 deposit-taking
companies. The criteria on the exercise of the powers by the
Commissioner are not explicitly defined, which may deter the investors
interest in banks.
Limitations on Loans
The control extends to what kind of securities an institution
can accept to pledge against the loans. Under this Bill, an institution
shall not, except with the approval of the Commissioner, lend against
the security of its own shares, share of its holding companies,
subsidiaries or other companies in the same group.
A proposal to change the legal definition of companies is mad
to tighten lending activities. The definition is revised so that
exposure to overseas companies related to directors or major share-
holders of an institution will be monitored. Under the Bill, the
Commissioner can also examine the oversea subsidiaries of a locally
incorporated institution.
This is to eradicate the problem of banks circumventing the
lending restrictions through offshore shell companies, which has been
a common feature in past bank failures.
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The Commissioner can issue directions, in the Gazette, to
institutions not to engage in business practices which, in his
opinion, may or will cause the soundness of an institution
dependent on a single party. This is to prevent over-exposing the
bank to the credit worthiness of that party.
If an institution has extended loans to a nominee company,
the Commissioner may require it to identify the beneficial owner of
that company. Should the institution fail to do so, the Commissioner
may require full provisions against these loans.
This will plug the loopholes under the existing Ordinance that
a bank may over-extend itself to related parties or a single party
connected with its shareholders or directors which disguise themsely(
through nominee companies.
The effectiveness of identifying the nominee companies remains
to be seen, but undoubtedly the Government may want to put the onus
of disclosure of the nominee companies on the bank itself.
However, secrecy has long been regarded as an important factor
of Hong Kong's success as a financial center. This proposal may drive
away business, particularly form wealthy Chinese in Southeast Asia who
often insist on borrowing anonymously.
Having reviewed the Banking Bill 1986, we need to caution that
legislation and execution are two different matters. The capability
of the authorities to detect whether a bank is in trouble is extremely
important. The proposed Bill gives the Commissioner extensive power,
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but even in the past, the Commissione-r has had the authority to
examine a bank's books. It is an important task to upgrade the
quality of the Banking Commission Office in conjunction with thi
new legislation.
Everybody hopes the new Banking Bill will reduce the risk of
bank failures. But in reality, smart people can get around even the
tightest rules and government authorities are playing the never-
ending game of closing the loopholes.
Under the new Banking Bill, the strong institutions will survive
and the weak ones will perish. Mergers and acquisitions will be a featur
in restructuring the banking sector in Hong Kong. It will be common
to find smaller local banks being acquired by foreign parties. It is
also possible that small local banks will merge with each other in
order to survive. A list of the family controlled local banks is
shown in appendix VII. The writer believes tough legislation may not




From the past experience, banks are subject to runs no matter they
are big or small. Even the size of Continental Illinois Bank and Trust
Company ran into difficulty in 1984. If Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) of the U.S.A. did not exist, the damaging consequences
from that bank failure would be enormous. Over the past 50 years, we
have experienced less than 20 bank troubles, of which only two were
actually declared bankrupt. On the other hand, our U.S.A. counterpart
has over 550 cases of bank failures during the same period. That did not
cause big problems in U.S.A. because the FDIC provides the insurance for
depositors.
It is understandable that depositors queue up to withdraw their
money at the first sign of trouble. Since we do not have explicit
guarantee of the safety of their deposits in banks, we cannot condemn
their behaviour as irresponsible. If it is an isolated case, it will be
easier to handle because it is a matter of recycling the deposits within
the banking industry. Once the run is spreading from one bank to another,
it is extremely difficult to control.
Under the present Ordinance, a bank is required to maintain a minimur
liquid asset ratio of 25%, of which only a small portion is in cash. The
Government statistics showed the ratio of vault cash to total deposits of
all banks in Hong Kong declined from 12.7% in 1955 to 1.9% in 1972. If
thPrP are widespread bank runs, this small cash reserve just cannot satisfy
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the depositors' demand. This is why we must prevent a bank run from
starting at all.
With today's sophisticated electronic banking, large depositors
do not have to queue up at banks to withdraw their money. All they have
to do is to telex transfer their money to a foreign bank in New York if
their confidence towards the Hong Kong banking industry is shaken. If
everybody is withdrawing, even the healthiest bank will run into trouble.
We had this experience on 23 September 1983, which showed the confidence
of Hong Kong people is very sensitive and fragile.
The Hong Kong Government is well aware of the effect of bank runs
towards the stability and credibility of Hong Kong's banking and financial
system. It took no chance by acquiring Hang Lung Bank in 1983 and OTB
and HKICB in 1985, as soon as troubles started. It has subsequently
assisted or supported the acquiring of Ka Wah Bank by CITIC, and directed
Jardine Fleming and Company Limited to assume control and carry on the
business of the Union Bank. In each case, the Government is using Exchange
Fund to rescue the troubled bank.
The Government knows it is vital to devise a panic-proof system which
removes the motives for bank runs. Presently, the only option is to
resort to Exchange Fund to support the troubled bank. The use of Exchange
Fund does provide stability for the financial system. In effect, the
Government is providing free deposit insurance to the depositors and banks.
However, this practice drew fire from the Legco members. Sir John Bremridgi
had to defend his situation to justify the use of the Fund. At the same
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time, he was forced to hint that the Government might take a harder line
against saving a small bank in trouble in the future. During the Legislative
Council meeting on 9 April 1986, Sir John said, One day, the sooner the
better, there will not be support for a small bank in trouble. We will be
ruthless in this regard provided that it does not result in serious damage
to the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong. Although this comment seems to
soothe the dissatisfaction of the Legco members more than anything, it has
inevitably shaken the confidence of the depositors in the small banks.
The effectiveness of free insurance provided by the Government is greatly
reduced.
The question of equality is also raised when the Government rescued only
the banking industry. Public fund should not be used to support an individual
company. The cost of a bank rescue should be borne by the banking industry
itself. The effectiveness of deposit insurance has been shown in U.S.A. and
other countries which have adopted such scheme. It is in this spirit that
the deposit insurance is proposed in this paper.
Deposit Insurance in Other Countries
Czechoslovakia was reported to be the first country to introduce
deposit insurance on a nationwide basis in 1924. At present, 12 countries
employ deposit insurance in one form or another: Argentina, Canada, Chile,
West Germany, India, Japan, Netherlands, Philippines, Spain, Turkey, United
Kingdom and U.S.A.
The U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was established
in 1934 after the banking crisis during the great depression of 1930-33.
There were some 9000 bank closures, most of which were basically sound,
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according to Friedman and Schwartz. The losses of the depositors and the
general economy were so great that the authority decided to set up FDIC
to provide the stability for the financial system.
It has been agreed that the FDIC is the most comprehensive and
successful scheme. Initially, the maximum level of coverage was US$2500,
this was subsequently raised many times to US$100,000 in 1980. In 1980,
some 97% of all banks in the U.S.A. joined this scheme. The success of
FDIC can be shown by the fact that, of the over 550 banks that failed,
none was caused by bank runs, and 99.8% of depositors were fully compensated
Federal deposit insurance has performed a signal service in rendering the
banking system panic-proof.' The FDIC was also the most important structure
change in U.S. monetary system in the direction of greater stability.2
The insured bank pays a premium of 1/12 of 1% of their total deposi-
to FDIC. However, the fund was accumulated over the years while there wa
small amount of claims. FDIC offered a premium rebate to the banks every
year from 1949-1984. In effect, the premium paid by the bank is less tha:
1/12 of 1%. In 1985, FDIC had to set aside US$2.3 billion for losses, of
which, 1.3 billion was loss expected from the bailout of Continental
Illinois Bank and Trust Company. Because the increase in reserves for
losses exceeded the premiums paid to the FDIC find by insured banks, ther,
would not be a premium rebate for the first time since 1949. In 1985, thl
insurance fund had a revenue of US$3.4 billion: about US$1.4 billion fro]
insurance premiums, another US$2 billion from income on its investment
portfolio. Even after the increase in loss reserves, the fund's net wort]
rose to US$17.9 billion.
1,2. M. Friedman, A Program for Monetary 5tatiiiry fro uriwi uiilvti3j
Press, 1959) P.38, P.21.
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The United Kingdom has been late in adopting deposit insurance. The
British bankers used to consider their banks so well managed that they
had no single bank failure even in the Great Depression. However, in the
1973/74 banking crisis, the Bank of England had to orgainze the "Lifeboat"
operation to prevent the panic from spreading. In 1979, the Bank Act
provides for a Deposit Protection Fund which was set up in 1980. Under
the scheme, the member institutions contribute 0.03% to 0.06% of their
total deposits as insurance premium. The coverage is three-quarters of
the deposits up to a maximum of E10,000.
In Canada, the coverage is Can $60,000 and the premium is 1/30 of 1%.
In Japan, the coverage is three million Yen while the premium is 0.006%.
In all four countries, foreign currency deposits are not insured.
The schemes adopted in these countries, especially FDIC in the U.S.A.
should shed some light in setting up a similiar scheme in Hong Kong.
Proposed Deposit Insurance Scheme in Hong Kong
The main issues involved in setting up a deposit insurance scheme for
Hong Kong are as follows:
Coverage
From the depositors' point of view, the scheme should provide 100%
coverage. However, it may place a very heavy burden to the insured bank and
the insurance company. From the previous section, all other countries have
set a maximum insured amount. At the end of 1980, deposits up to US$100,000
accounted for less than 72% of the total deposits in the U.S.A.. The
iininCn]rAd deposits mostly belonged to corporate accounts and certificates
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of deposits. It is argued that the large depositors are sophisticated enoug}
to choose the banks. They can also exert pressure on the banks to run
properly, otherwise they will switch to another safer bank.
Mr. Y. F. Law, assistant general manager of Wing Lung Bank Ltd., said
that deposits of under HK$100,000 accounted for only about 25% of
its total deposits. If this is an indicator for other banks in Hong
Kong, we must set a higher insurance coverage to give protection of
at least 75% of all depositors.
The survey shows HK$250,000 should be sufficient. Large depositors
can spread their deposits among different banks, thereby in effect receive
full coverage on their deposits. If they put all their eggs in one basket
in order to receive higher interest, they must assume the risk themselves.
Premium
The insurance premium should be determined by the risks involved and
the level of coverage. A syndication of international insurance companies
had proposed to accept the deposit insurance with a premium of 0.15o,which
is almost double of the U.S. rate. However, it was proposed at the time
of the worst banking crisis in Hong Kong and they were private companies
aiming at profit making.
With the total Hong Kong dollar deposits standing at around 220 billion,
premium rate of 1/12 of 1% represents HK$180 million revenue per year. It
may not be sufficient to bail out a large bank failure in the first few
years of operation. However, I am sure it will be in the same position as
FDIC over time when the fund can grow from the revenue of insurance
47
premiums and from income on its investment portfolio. Especially now that
all the troubled banks are practically revealled, the operating agency of
this scheme should have some breathing room.
Due to the fact that there are large and small banks as well as well-
managed and poor-managed banks, a variable rate should be adopted in order
to be fair. Like all other insurance schemes, riskier business always pays
higher premium. It will also act as an incentive for the bank to run
properly. The variable rate can be set at four classes or a flat rate plus
additional premium. In determining the rate for each class or the additional
premium, the agency must consider these factors:
1. The degree of risk of its assets.
2. The weight distribution of its current deposits, saving deposits, time
deposits and certificates of deposits.
3. The maturity of its time deposits and certificates of deposits.
4. The magnitude of fluctuation of different categories of deposits.
5. The weight between different categories of loans and advances.
6. The magnitude of fluctuation of different categories of loans and
advances.
7. The magnitude of fluctuation of the bank's earnings.
8. The level of operating commitments.
9. The quality of management, especially its internal control.
Although it is rather troublesome in determining the rate which some-
times is a subjective matter, it is advisable to work with the Office of the
Rankig Commissioner to derive such a rate. It is also advised the rate
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be reviewed once or twice a year, or at the request of the bank. In the
latter case. the expenses will be borne by the bank concerned.
Operating Agency
A majority of the existing schemes in other countries are run by
government or quasi-government bodies. In U.S.A., the FDIC is an agency
of the Federal Government. It offers deposit insurance, sets entry
regulations, performs bank examinations and rescues failed banks. Their
bank examinations are in addition to the State Commissions and the Federal
Reserve System.
The idea of running the scheme by a private company should be rejected
since no such individual company has the credibility and financial backing
to take on such scheme. The syndication of insurance companies can be
considered. However, this idea was rejected for the following reasons:
1. The confidence of the public in the syndication is questionable.
If a bank can fail, so does an insurance company.
2. The syndication is reponsible to its shareholders and the earning will
be distributed every year. Reserves provide for loan losses will be
limited.
3. Banks are reluctant to release full information to a private company
for the reason of confidentiality. Especially many banks in Hong Kong
also have insurance companies as their subsidiaries, sensitive infor-
mation may be leaked to their competitors.
In Hong Kong, the ideal agency should be a quasi-government body
called Hong Kong Deposit Insurance Corporation (HKDIC). This idea is
also favored by the public during the telephone interviews. It should
work in parallel with, rather than a substitute of, the Office of the Banking
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Commissioner in determining entry regulation, variable premium rate, bank
examination and rescuing banks.
All locally incorporated banks will be required by statute to join
the scheme. The overseas incorporated foreign banks will be at their
discretion to decide whether to join. DTCs can also join the scheme if
they want to, the premium may be higher if HKDIC warrant it to be riskier.
However, the HKDIC should be empowered with the right to refuse any applicant
The original capital for setting up HKDIC can be provided by the
advanced premium payments and loans at favorable rate by the member banks
if necessary. Hong Kong Government will pledge the Exchange Fund as a
backing for the first three years to boost the confidence of the public
toward HKDIC. Since HKDIC is a quasi-government body set up for the good
of Hong Kong, one cannot criticize the Government for using the Exchange
Fund to finance the private commercial failure. It is believed that HKDIC
will be able to stand on its own without using the fund if it does use
it in the first few years, it will have no trouble in repayment once the
system functions properly.
FPacihilit of Deposit Insurance in Hong Kong
In the previous discussions, it is obvious that the scheme has some
technicalities needed to be solved. With today's sophisticated computer
and management expertise in insurance, it is not hard to find a solution.
It is clear to the writer that the scheme is technically feasible.
From the depositors' point of view, 1/12 of 1% is hardly anything,
even if the banks pass the cost onto the customers. They will have peace
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in mind when they put their savings in the banks.
Deposit insurance provides stability to the financial industry
by reducing the chance of bank runs. It is generally agreed that an,
uninterrupted financial system is vital to the prosperity and stability
of the economy. Using U.S.A. as our example, the cost for the bank
to join the scheme is 0.0129% on top of the premium paid to FDIC.
Compared to the devastating effect of bank runs during the Great
Depression, the cost we pay for a stable banking industry is indeed
very small. It is concluded that the scheme is economically feasible.
With such a great idea, why is it still on the shelf? Dr.
Y.C. Jao had in fact proposed such a scheme as early as 1974 and again
in 1982. Apparently, the large banks believe they are well managed,
so it is unfair for them to subsidize the small banks. Mr. M.L. Lam
said his bank is not willing to see such a scheme adopted because his
bank has the backing of the Bank of China which is as good as, if not
better than, any insurance scheme. However, he personally thinks such
a scheme would be beneficial to the banking industry as a whole.
Mr Y_F_aw_ on the other hand, rejected the scheme totally
because:
1. It is not fair to the large, well-managed banks.
2. The scheme has minimal effectiveness. If confidence is shaken when
the colony approaches 1997, nothing can stop the bank run.
3. No insurance company is big and creditworthy enough to take on
such a scheme.
4. The Government will be put into the same situation of employing
the Exchange Fund to rescue ailing banks, if it operates the insurance
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scheme.
S. If insurance is adopted, some bankers may tempt to take on riskier
business.
Mr. Michael Sandberg, Chairman of Hong Kong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation, also said that it is unreasonable for well-
managed banks to subsidize those mismanaged banks. Mr. David K.P. Li
also holds such comment when asked of his opinion on deposit insurance.
It is learned that The Hong Kong Association of Banks and The Chinese
Banks' Association Ltd. also rejected the idea. However, a variable
rate scheme would solve most of their equity problem.
It is further argued that moral hazard is not unique to deposit
insurance, life insurance being the most obvious example. One cannot
reasonably think that someone will risk his own life when he has bought
life insurance. Furthermore, the deposit insurance is a complement of,
and not a substitute for, the prudential supervision by the Banking
Commissioner. The harzard can be minimized through stringent control
and regulation by the authority.
The Government's attitude is rather vague. Sir John Bremridge
proposed the scheme for the banks to discuss its feasibility. When the
banks rejected the idea, he quietly went along. Mr. Robert Fell, the
Banking Commissioner,made a comment on deposit insurance: In any case,
it is the volatility of large deposits and interbank lines that causes
the problem when a danger'sign is hoisted for a particular bank rather
than run by small depositors. The argument the other way is that an
insurance scheme with a varibale premium might well prove to be a
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useful disciplinary measure in problem cases.
It seems that the Government does not want to take a stand in
this case. It should be reminded that when the FDIC was first proposed,
the American Bankers Association, dominated by the major banks,
violently attacked it as unsound, unscientific, unjust and dangerous.3
However, history's verdict is exactly the opposite and the U.S. Government
is glad to do what it did in 1934.
In order to spare the headache of rescuing the failed banks, the
Government should take a positive approach in legislating that all banks
will be required by statute to join the insurance scheme. The ideal
time in setting up such a scheme is when the industry is stable and
prosperous. We have to prepare for the rainy days. It also allows some
breathing space for the newly formed agency and gives it a better chance
to succeed. However, people often fear changes and tend to forget the
past difficulites during the time of prosperity. The writer thinks it
is time for the large banks to get rid of their selfishness and get
together to do something good for their own industry.
3. J.K. Galbraith, Money: Whence It Came, Where It Went
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1975) P.196-197.
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CHAPTER VII
A SURVEY OF PUBLIC OPINION TOWARDS DEPOSIT INSURANCE
The idea of deposit insurance has been rejected by the Banking
Advisory Committee and the Government. Consultation on the issue is
primarily between the Government and the banking industry. The
public, who ultimately shoulder the cost of a bank rescue, are being
ignored. The writer wants to find out their opinion on this issue.
A survey was conducted in the beginning of April 1986. That
was at a time right after the Government directed Jardine Fleming to
assume control of the Union Bank. Although the survey may be distorted
a little due to that incident, the results do provide some valuable
information.
The objectives of this survey are:
1. To find out the public opinion towards deposit insurance.
2. To determine the appropriate level of coverage.
The questionnaire is shown in appendix XIII. The writer has made
233 calls, of which, 100 responses were collected. The result is
tabulated in appendix IX. The public overwhelmingly agreed that deposit
insurance is beneficial to depositors. Even if the depositors have
to pay the insurance premium of 1/12 of 1% of their deposits annually,
some 67% of the repondents favor the scheme.
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74% of the interviewees have deposits under HK$200,000 in an
individual bank, while 90% have deposits under HK$300,000. However,
the maximum coverage of HK$200,000 will satisfy only 43% of the
interviewees, while the coverage of HK$300,000 will satisfy 76% of
the interviewees. Since depositors tend to ask for a higher amount
of coverage for better protection, the writer concludes that the
coverage of HK$250,000 should be adequate for the time being. It
should give protection to at least 75% of all deposits by individual
depositors. This ceiling can be raised as circumstances arise.
The result of the survey clearly indicated that the deposit




The Hong Kong Government has so far rescued all the troubled
banks. The political tension in the run-up to 1997 makes the
Government reluctant to allow even small ripples in the banking
sector for fear that it may grow into a major confidence crisis.
While it is ture that regulatory procedures and a system of
prudential supervision set out in the Banking Bill 1986 can go a
long way to ensure a safe and sound banking and deposit-taking
sector, it cannot absolutely prevent an individual institution from
getting into financial troubles. The office of the Banking
Commissioner is not designed to guarantee the repayment of liabilities
in the event of an institution failure. With the absence of a central
bank which can serve as a lender of last resort, Hong Kong depositors
are easily susceptible to rumors of bank difficulties. Under the
existing fractional reserve system, no financial institution can
survive sustained bank runs.
It is vital to have a panic-proof device to remove the motives
for bank runs. Deposit insurance will be such a device. Although it
is rejected by the Government and the major banks, a survey by the
writer confirms the public welcome such a scheme.
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Deposit insurance and banking supervision are only part of an
interlocking series of issues that face the Hong Kong banking industry.
Other issues are:
1. Quality of management. No insurance plan can protect depositors
from fraud or gross mismanagement. Government, through licensing
and monitoring procedures, can minimize the imprudence of the
bank management. This issue has been addressed in the Banking Bill
1986. However, the solution mainly relies on the self-discipline
of the banking sector.
2. Quality of information. The financial disclosure in the audited
reports of banks in Hong Kong is generally inadequate. The concept
of inner reserves which helps the bank to conceal its full picture
in the financial statements should be abolished. It is the absence
of meaningful information that fuels rumors and causes depositors
and money managers panic.
3. Industry structure. In addition to the Banking Bill 1986, two
policy issues need to be reconsidered. The current three-tier
suructure of the Hong Kong banking industry may no longer be
relevant and needs further study. The interest rate agreement,
which requires banks to provide uniform rates to small depositors,
has outlived its usefulness. The agreement helps neither to
defend the exchange rate nor to protect small banks from competition.
On the contrary, it puts the small banks out of competition
for the low cost saving-deposit market. This seriously affects
their competitive edge against the big banks. The writer thinks
the interest rate agreement should be discussed and abolished orderly.
4. Lender of last resort. With the absence of a central bank which
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could serve as a lender of last resort, small banks will have
difficulties to discount their assets for the needed cash. A
quasi-government operated or privately operated lender of last
resort should be considered.
The Banking Bill 1986 may reduce the risk of more bank failures
as it gives the regulators a stronger hand to detect the problems of
a bank. It remains to be seen, however, what impact this important
piece of legislation will have on the business pattern of banks as well
as on the financial system in the long run.
Having reviewed all the issues, the writer concludes that deposit
insurance is a feasible device to ensure the long-term stability of
the banking system. However, in order to have a truly effective deposit
insurance scheme, a framework of stringent prudential regulations
must be in place.
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CAPITAL TO RISK ASSETS
RATIO OF AUTHORIZED INSTITUTIONS
C.4pitzlto nsk 102. (I) Subject to this Part and Part X. an authorized institution incorporated
isxts ratio. in HongKongshall not, at any time, have a capital to risk assets ratio of less than 5
ThirdSchcdutc. per cent as calculated in accordance with the provisions of the Third Schedule and
subsection (2).
(2) For the purposes of calculating the capital to risk assets ratio of an
authorized institution. the accounts of the institution are not required to be on a
consolidated basis unless the Commissioner otherwise determines in any particular
(3) The Financial Secretary may, by notice in the Ga:ette. vary the percentage
specified in subsection (1).
Failurcto kccpto 103. (1) Where an authorized institution contravenes section 102(1), it shall
capitalto risk forthwith notify the Commissioner of that contravention and provide him with such
assetsratio. particulars of that contravention as he may require.
(2) Where the Commissioner is notified under subsection (1) of a contravention
of section 102(1). he shall forthwith notify the Financial Secretary of that contraven-
tion and provide him with such particulars of that contravention as he may require.
(3) Every director and every manager of an auLhorizcd institution which
contravenes subsection (1) commits an offence and is liable on conviction upon
indictment to a fine of S500.000 and to imprisonment for 5 years and, in the case of a
continuing offence, to a further fine of S 10.000 for every day during which the offence
continues.
104. (1) Where an authorized institution contravenes section 102(1), the institu-Remedialaction.
tion and the Commissioner shall enter into discussions for the purposes of determin-
ing what remedial action is required to be taken by the institution for it to comply
with that section. but the Commissioner is not bound by any such discussions.
(2) The Commissioner may, after holding such discussions as he thinks fit under
subsection (1). by notice in writing served on the authorized institution. require the
institution to take such remedial action as is specified in the notice for the purpose of
having the institution comply with section 102(1).
(3) Any authorized institution aggrieved by any requirement contained in a
notice under subsection (2) served on it by the Commissionermay appeal, by notice in
writing served on the Commissioner and the Financial Secretary stating the grounds
of the appeal. to the Financial Secretary against the requirement, but that require-
ment shall take effect immediately, notwithstanding that an appeal has been or may
be made under this subsection.
(4) The Financial Secretary shall determine an appeal under subsection (3) by
confirming, varying or reversing the requirement the subject of the appeal.
(5) Every director and every manager of an authorized institution which
contravenes any requirement contained in a notice under subsection (2) commits an
offence and is liable on conviction upon indictment to a fine of 5500,000 and to
imprisonment for 5 years and, in the case of a continuing ofence, to a further fine of
510.000 for every day during which the offence continues.
Commissioner105. (1) The Commissioner may, by notice in writing served on an authorized
mayincrcastinstitutio vary the capital to risk assets ratio specified in sccuon102(1) in relation to capitalto risk
assctsratioforthat institution by increasing the ratio to-
particular(a) in the case of an authorized institution which is a bank, not more than 8 per authonzcd
insttcutions.cent and
(b) in the case of an authorized institution which is a deposit-taking company,
not more than 10 per cent
and where the ratio is so varied, the other provisions of this Part shall. in relation to
that institution. apply as if the ratio specified in section 102 (1) wherethe ratio as so
varied.
(2) The Financial Secretary may, by notice in the Gasette. vary any percentage
specified in subsection(I).
(3) An authorized institution aggrieved by a variation of the capital to risk
assets ratio contained in a notice under subsection (1) served on it by the Commis-
sioner may appeal, by notice in writing served on the Commissionerand the Financial
Secretary stating the grounds of the appeal, to the Financial Secretary against the
variation, but that variation shall take effect immediately, notwithstanding that an
appeal has been or may be made under this subsection.
(4) The Financial Secretary shall determine an appeal under subsection (3) by




LIQUIDITY RATIO OF AUTHORIZED INSTITUTIONS AND
MATTERS AFFECTING LIQUIDITY RATIO
106. (1) Subject to this Part and Part X, every authorized institution shall Liquidityratio.
maintain a liquidity ratio of not less than 25 per cent in each calendar month as
calculated in accordance with the provisions of the Fourth Schedule and this Part. Fourth Schcdulc.
(2) The liquidity ratio of an authorized institution shall be calculated for each
calendar month on the basis of the average of the daily liquidity ratio for the calendar
month concerned.
(3) For the purposes of calculating the liquidity ratio of an authorized
institution--
(a) in the case of an authorized institution operating in Hong Kong and also
elsewhere, the principal place of business in Hong Kong and local branches
of the institution shall be deemed collectively to be a separate institution
carrying on business in Hong Kong and
(b) all the qualifying liabilities within the meaning of the.Fourth Schedule of an Fourth Schcduic.
authorized institution owed through the principal place of business in Hong
Kong or any local branch of the institution operating in Hong Kong and
also elsewhere shall be regarded as if they constituted liabilities of that
separate institution, and all the liquefiable. assets within the meaning of the
Fourth Schedule held by or to the credit ofihe principal place of business in
Hong Kong or any local branch shall be regarded as if they were assets of
that se aratc institution.
(4) The Financial Secretary may, by notice in the Gazette. vary the percentage
specified in subsection (1).
107. (1) Where an authorized institution contravenes section 106(1), it shall Failurr to kccp to
liquidity ratio.forthwith notify the Commissioner of that contravention and provide him with such
particulars of that contravention as he may require.
(2) Where the Commissioner is notified under subsection (1) of a contravention
of section 106(1), he shall forthwith notify the Financial Secretary of that contraven-
tion and provide him with such particulars of that contravention as he may require_
(3) Every director and every manager of an authorized institution which
contravenes subsection (1) commits an offence and is liable on conviction upon
indictment to a fine of 5500.000 and to imprisonment for 5 years and, in the case of a
continuing offence. to a further fine of S 10,000 for every day during which the offence
continues.
108. (1) Where an authorized institution contravenes section 106(1), theRcmcdialaction.
institution and the Commissioner shall enter into discussions for the purposes of
determining what remedial action is required to be taken by the institution for
it to comply with that section, but the Commissioner is not bound by any such
discussions.
(2) The Commissioner may, after holding such discussions as he thinks fit under
subsection (1), by notice in writing served on the authorized institution, require the
institution to take such remedial action as is specified in the notice for the purpose of
having the institution comply with section 106(1).
(3) Any authorized institution aggrieved by any requirement contained in a
notice under subsection (2) served on it by the Commissioner may appeal, by notice in
writing served on the Commissioner and the Financial Secretary stating the grounds
of the appeal, to the Financial Secretary against the requirement. but that require-
ment shall take effect immediately, notwithstanding that an appeal has been or may
be made under this subsection.
(4) The Financial Secretary shall determine an appeal under subsection (3) by
confirming. varying or reversing the requirement the subject of the appeal.
(5) Every director and every manager of an authorized institution which
contravenes any requirement contained in a notice under subsection (2) commits an
offence and is liable on conviction upon indictment to a fine of S500.000 and to
imprisonment for 5 Years and, in the case of a continuing offence, to a further fine of
$10.000 for every day during which the offence continues.
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109. (1) The Commissioner may, by notice in writing served on an authorizedCornrntssioncr
mayvary liquidity institution, vary the liquidity ratio specified in section 106(1) in relation to that
ratio for particular institution by increasing or decreasing the ratio and, where the ratio is so varied.authorized
sections 106, 107 and 108 shall, in relation to that institution, apply as if the ratioinsutucions.
specified in section 106(1) were the ratio as so vaned.
(2) Where the Commissioner varies under subsection (1). the liquidity ratio of
any authorized institution, he shall forthwith provide the Financial Secretary with
particulars of the variation.
(3) An authorized institution aggrieved by a variation of the liquidity ratio
contained in a notice under subsection (1) served on it by the Commissioner. may
appeal. by notice in writing served on the Commissioner and the Financial Secretary
stating the grounds of the appeal, to the Financial Secretary against the variation, but
that variation shall take effect immediately, notwithstanding that an appeal has been
or may be made under this subsection.
(4) The Financial Secretary shall determine an appeal under subsection (3) by
confirming, varying or reversing the variation of liquidity ratio the subject of the
appeal.
110. (1) Subject to subsection (2), an authortzed institution shall not, exceptAuthorucd
institutions not to with the approval of the Commissioner. which approval shall be subject to such
crcate certain conditions as he may think proper to attach thereto, by whatever means cause the
charges and
sum total of all charges over its assets (excluding contra items) in Hong Kong toto notify
Commissioner of exceed 5 per cent of the sum total of the value of those. assets...
certain avil
(2) Where, immediately upon the commencement of this Ordinance, the sumprocrcdcng3.
total of all charges over an authorized institution's assets (excluding contra items)
in Hong Kong exceeds 5 per cent of the sum total of the value of those assets, the
institution shall be deemed to have an approval under subsection (1) unul-
(a) the expiration of 3 months after that commencement. or such further period
as the Commts.sioner may allow in any particular cast or
(b) it receives an approval under subsection (1),
whichever first occurs.
(3) Subject to subsection (4), where any civil proceedings have been instituted
against any authorized institution to recover claimed indebtedness, irrespective of
whether the proceedings, have been instituted before, on or after the commencement
of this Ordinance, and the subject of the proceedings. or part of the proceedings. are
or may be any assets of the institution. the institution shall, if those proceedings
adversely affect, or could adversely affect, the financial position of the institution.
forthwith notify the Commissioner of those proceedings and provide the Commis-
sioner with such particulars of those proceedings as he may require.
(4) An authorized institution incorporated outside Hong Kong is not required
to notify the Commissioner of civil proceedings referred to in subsection (3) if those
proceedings arc instituted outside Hong Kong.
(5) Every director and every manager of an authorized institution which
contravenes subsection (1) or (3) commits an offence and is liable-
(a) on conviction upon indictment to a fine of 5200.000 and to imprisonment
for 2 years and, in the case of a- continuing offence. to a further fine of
510,000 for every day during which the offence continues: and
(b) on summary conviction to a fine of 550.000 and to imprisonment for 6
months and, in the case of a continuing offence. to a further fine of SS.000
for every day during which the offence continues.
(6) For the purposes of subsections (1) and (2}-
"charges" includes liens, encumbrances, equitable interests and third party rights
"value" shall have the same meaning assigned to it in section 79(2).
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APPENDIX V
THIRD SCHEDULE [ss. 102 & 139(3).]
CAPITAL TO RISK ASSETS RATIO
1. The capital to risk assets ratio of an authorized institution shall be
calculated as that ratio, expressed as a percentage, between the capital base. as
calculated in paragraph 2. and the risk assets, as calculated in paragraph 3, of the
institution.
2. The capital base of an authorized institution shall be calculated by adding
the value, in Hong Kong dollars, of its
(a) paid-up capital:
(b) perpetual subordinated debt convertible into equity at option of issuer, but
excluding any amount in excess of half the paid-up capital
(c) general reserves, including inner reserves, share premium account and
revaluation reserves, but excluding provisions however described and
(d) undistributed pronts, but excluding unprovided but declared dividends not
yet paid
and by deducting the value, in Hong Kong dollars, of its-
(i} investments in any subsidiary, any associated company and any holding
company
(ii) loans and other expenses which, in the opinion of the Commissioner, are of
a capitai nature and
(iii) goodwill.
3. The risk assets of an authorized institution shall be calculated by adding the
value, in Hong Kong dollars, of the assets specified in each of the following categories
after each such value has been multiplied by the risk weight specified for that
category--
(o) Category I--risk height 0.0
(i) Government certificates of indebtedness held for note issue,
(ii) cash in till: and
(iii) contingent liabilities in respect of forward foreign exchange con-
tracts, interest rate swaps, option contracts, futures contracts, bills held for
collection of customers, and shipping guarantees and trust receipts in
respect of unmatured trade finance transactions:
(b) Category 11-risk weight 0..2
(i) unsubordinated claims on or contingent liabilities in respect of
eligzible banks or eligible governments, or having such banks or govern-
ments unconditional guarantee, maturing or callable within less than one
year:
(ii) claims or contingent liabilities secured by cash or cash deposits with
the institution and under its complete control: and
(iii) bullion or listed securities held against the institution's liability to
customers or under resale agreements:
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(c) Category III-risk weight 0.5--
(i) negotiable unsubordinated bills, notes, paper and listed securities, at
current market value, with a remaining term to maturity of not less than one
and not more than 10 years, drawn on or issued or guaranteed by eligible
banks or eligible governments, and which are quoted on a stock exchange
approved by the Commissioner for the purposes of this Schedule or by not
less than 2 brokers recognized by the Commissioner for the purposes of thisSchedule:
(ii) unmatured import and export trade finance through bills or notes
maturing within 6 months
(iii) unsubordinated claims on or contingent liabilities in respect of
registered deposit-taking companies (except deposit-taking companies the
registration of which is for the time being suspended under this Ordinance)
or having such companies unconditional guarantee, maturing or callable
within less than one year and
(iv) all contingent liabilities not otherwise specified in this term, and
including any net under-writing commitments
(d) Category IV-risk weight 1.0--all other assets.
4. For the purposes of this Schedule--
"eligible bank" means-
(a) any authorized institution which is a bank or licensed deposit-taking
company; and
(b) any other bank incorporated outside Hong Kong except such a bank which
is, in the opinion of the Commissioner, not adequately supervised by the




(b) any other government whose debt has not been in arrears at any time during
the 5 years immediately preceding the date on which the relevant calculation
of the capital to risk assets ratio is made and




FOURTH SCHEDULE (ss. 106 & 139(3).
LIQUIDITY RATIO
1. The liquidity ratio of an authorized institution shall be calculated as that
ratio, expressed as a percentage, between the qualifying liabilities, as specified in para-
graph 2, and the liquefiable assets, as specified in paragraph 3, of the institution.
2. The qualifying liabilities of an authorized institution shall be calculated by
adding the value, in Hong Kong dollars, of-
(a) its net interbank liabilities (including marketable claims) and
(b) all its other liabilities,
maturing or callable within one month.
3. The liquefiable assets of an authorized institution shall be calculated by
adding the book value or current market value, whichever is the lesser, in Hong Kong
dollars, of such of its following assets which are freely available to meet any
qualifying liabilities-
(a) net interbank claims (including marketable claims) maturing or callabl
within one month
(b) cash in till
(c) gold
(d) unmatured discountable export bills maturing within 6 months and expor
bills which are payable after sight, denominated in a currency freer
convertible into Hong Kong dollars
(e) bills, certificates, notes, paper and debt securities (other than marketable
claims maturing or callable within one month) which-
(i) are negotiable
(ii) have a remaining term to maturity of not more than 10 years
(iii) are issued by persons whose debts have not been in arrears withir
the immediately preceding 5 years
(iv) are denominated and traded in a currency freely convertible intc
Hong Kong dollars and
(v) are quoted.on a stock exchange approved by the Commissioner for
the purposes of this Schedule or by not less than 2 brokers recognized by the
Commissioner for the purposes of this Schedule
(f securities issued or guaranteed by the Government or any other government
approved by the Commissioner for the purposes of this Schedule and
(g) performing loans, instalments of. loans, including interest on such loans,
which will be paid in cash within one month, but excluding overdrafts and
other loans repayable at short notice.
4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2(a) and 3(a), the expression interbank
means between the authorized institution concerned and-
(a) any other authorized institution and
(b) any bank incorporated outside Hong Kong.
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APPENDIX VII
FAMILY CONTROLLED LOCAL BANKS
Local Banks with Foreign Participation
Name of Bank Controlled by or Controlling Number Total Assets
Affiliated with Family of (HK Dollars 2Branches in billion)(Controlling percentage) (percentage)
Bank of Canton Security Pacific
Ltd. 17 7.6National Bank (99%)
Commercial Bank Mr. Chan 11 3.22Bangkok Bank (10%)
of Hong Kong Ltd. Tokai Bank (10%)
Dao Heng Bank 22 3.39Hong Leong Overseas (HK)
Ltd. Ltd. (100%)
Far East Bank Sino Master Investment Mr. Chiu 34 1.96
Ltd. Ltd. (25%) (70%)
Hang Seng Bank Hong Kong Shanghai Mr. Ho 65 67
Ltd. Banking Corp. (61%)
Ka Wah Bank Ltd. CITIC (92% under 27Mr. Low 5.5
(70% beforerestructuring proposal)
rescue)
Kwong On Bank 25 4.26Mr. LeongFuji Bank (55%)
Ltd.
27 4.35Liu Chong Hing Mr. LiuMitsubishi Bank (25%)
Bank Ltd. (66%)
Mr. Fun g 3.015Wing Hang Bank Irving Trust Co. (51%)
Ltd.
Standard Chartered Bank Mr. Wu' 22 7.4Wing Lung Bank
Ltd. (35%+)(10%)
2.524Mr. KwokWing On Bank Ltd Hang Seng Bank Ltd.
(40%+ before(50.3% under proposal)
restructuring)
67
Local Banks without Foreign Participation
Total Assets
Name of Bank Controlling Family Number of (HK Dollars
(percentage) 1 Branches in billion) 2
Bank of East Asia Ltd 48 15.6Mr. Li (50%+)
11 1.79Dah Sing Bank Ltd Mr. Wong (55%)
4 0.89Hong Nin Savings Bank Mr. Li
Ltd.
0.304Tai Seng Bank Ltd. Mr. Ma (50%+)
0.241Tai Yau Bank Ltd. Mr. Ko (35%)
3.0612Union Bank Ltd. Mr. Wen (60%)
Source: Y.C. Jao, Banking and Currency in Hong Kong and current press
announcements
1. Controlling percentage is estimated.




1. Do you have a bank account?
Yes No
If the answer is no, no further question asked and treat
this interview as no response.
2. Do you know anything about deposit insurance?
Yes No
If the answer is no, briefly explain the function of
deposit insurance.
3. Do you think a deposit insurance scheme is beneficial to the
depositors?
Yes No
4. Do you agree that a deposit insurance scheme be adopted in
Hong Kong if the bank pays the insurance premium?
Yes No
S. Do you agree that a deposit insurance scheme be adopted in
Hong Kong if the depositor has to pay an annual insurance
premium of 1/12% of his total deposits.
Yes No
69
6. In your opinion, what is the appropriate amount of coverage?
A HK$100,000.00 B HK$200,000.00
HK$300,000.00C D HK$500,000.00 or over
7- The dnosl t insurance should be onerated by
private insurance company.A
B government.
independent quasi- government body called Hong KongC
Deposit Insurance Corporation.
8. What is the total balance( including saving, time deposit,







RESULTS OF THE SURVEY
1. Do you have a bank account?
Yes No
If the answer is no, no further question asked and treat this
interview as no response.
2. Do you know anything about deposit insurance?
Yac 149n (7
If the answer is no, briefly explain the function of deposit
insurance.
3. Do you think a deposit insurance scheme is beneficial to the
depositors?
Yes 74 No 26
4. Do you agree that a deposit insurance scheme be adopted in
Hong Kong if the bank pays the insurance premium?
Yes 71 No 29
S. Do you agree that a deposit insurance scheme be adopted in
Hong Kong if the depositor has to pay an annual insurance
premium of 1/12% of his total deposits.
Yes 67 No 33
71
6. In your opinion, what is the appropriate amount of coverage?
A 12 HK$100,000.00 B 31 HK$200,000.00
D 24 HK$500,000.00 or overC 33 HK$300,000.00
7. The deposit insurance should be operated by
A 39 private insurance company.
B 15 government.
C 46 independent quasi- government body called Hong Kong
Deposit Insurance Corporation.
8. What is the total balance( including saving, time deposit,
certificate of deposit) of your accounts in each bank?
A 38 under HK$100,000.00
B 31 HK$100,000.00- HK$200,000.00
C 15 HK$200,000.00- HK$300,000.00
D 9 over HK$300,000.00
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